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The Environmental Protection
Agency Turns Fifty
Jonathan H. Adler†
On July 9, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed Congress of his
plan to create a federal environmental-protection agency.1 In response
to growing environmental concerns and perceptions of an “environ–
mental crisis,”2 Nixon called for a new executive-branch agency tasked
with protecting the nation’s people and resources from pollution and
environmental harm. Although many environmental programs and
offices existed throughout the federal government, Nixon explained that
“only by reorganizing our Federal efforts” would it be possible to
“effectively ensure the protection, development and enhancement of the
total environment itself.”3 In his reorganization plan, Nixon called for
the establishment of a single agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), that would be empowered to “make a coordinated
attack on the pollutants which debate the air we breathe, the water we
drink, and the land that grows our food.”4
Creating this new agency required reassembling offices, bureaus and
responsibilities spread throughout the federal government, including
divisions within the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, and
†
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1.

See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6,
1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 202–07 (2006). The
Reorganization plan, which became effective on September 9, 1970, also
provided for the creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration within the Department of Commerce.

2.

See James Morton Turner & Andrew C. Isenberg, The
Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from
Nixon to Trump 12 (2018) (characterizing the period in which the EPA
was created as “a moment of environmental crisis”). While this was the
widespread perception at the time, many environmental problems had
begun to recede by the 1970s. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 93 (2004)
(discussing misperceptions of pre-1970 environmental trends); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Environmental Federalism in America: Let
Fifty Flowers Bloom, ch. 2 (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
author).

3.

See President Richard Nixon, Special Message from the President to the
Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental
Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (July 9, 1970), available at https://archive.epa.gov/epa/
aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970.html [https://perma.cc/KS6W63RT].

4.

Id.
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what was then known as the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.5 Other offices were transferred from smaller agencies, such as
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Radiation Council, and
the newly created Council on Environmental Quality.6 Although Nixon
was on record opposing the creation of new federal agencies, the need
for a more coordinated and effective federal response to environmental
concerns justified a one-time exception.7
From its inception, the EPA’s role and orientation was the subject
of conflict and debate.8 Although President Nixon rejected proposals to
create a federal environmental agency that would be simultaneously
responsible for environmental protection and resource development,9 he
nonetheless expected the Agency to integrate and balance
environmental protections with economic concerns.10 Some members of
Congress had other ideas, as did leaders in the rapidly expanding
environmental movement.11 In their view, the EPA should be an
unrelenting champion of environmental protection and a counterweight

5.

See Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon
Administration, 26 Presidential Stud. Q. 185, 188 (1996).

6.

The Council on Environmental Quality was established by the National
Environmental Policy Act in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 854–
56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2012)).

7.

See President Richard Nixon, supra note 3 (“In proposing that the
Environmental Protection Agency be set up as a separate new agency, I
am making an exception to one of my own principles: that, as a matter of
effective and orderly administration, additional new independent agencies
normally should not be created. In this case, however, the arguments
against placing environmental protection activities under the jurisdiction
of one or another of the existing departments and agencies are
compelling.”). Interestingly enough, the proposal for a new environmental
agency arose from a commission process initially designed to streamline
federal bureaucracy. See Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The
Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies 227–
28 (2nd ed. 1996) (discussing the debates within the Ash Council over the
creation of a new environmental agency).

8.

See Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 88–
89 (2004) (discussing the conflicts over the EPA’s role).

9.

See Marc K. Landy et al., The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions—From Nixon to Clinton
29–32 (expanded ed. 1994) (discussing the Nixon Administration’s
consideration and rejection of a proposal to create the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources).

10.

See id. at 33 (“The President and his aides expected the leader of the
EPA to be a balancer and integrator, to pursue environmental protection
in ways that were compatible with industrial expansion and resource
development.”).

11.

Id.
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to those agencies institutionally prone to support resource development
and economic growth.12
The EPA officially opened its doors on December 2, 1970.13 Its first
Administrator, William Ruckleshaus, took quickly to the role. He
vigorously pursued the enforcement of federal environmental laws,
including the newly enacted Clean Air Act.14 Indeed, during the first
sixty days of the EPA’s existence, it “brought five times as many
enforcement actions as the agencies it inherited had brought during any
similar period.”15 The new agency quickly made its presence felt.
Though Ruckleshaus may have hit the ground running, not all of
his successors would pursue enforcement with the same vigor, nor would
every subsequent administration support expansive conceptions of the
federal government’s role in addressing environmental pollution.
President Ford “effectively disowned the EPA” during his brief tenure
in office.16 The Reagan Administration, in particular, sought to curtail
the Agency’s footprint on the American economy.17 Others with more
environmentally friendly reputations have also sought to balance
economic and environmental concerns. Even the Obama Admin–
istration risked an environmental backlash by overruling an EPA
decision to tighten air-quality standards, reportedly due to concerns
about the political fallout.18
Virtually all human activity has an environmental effect, so
environmental concerns are omnipresent in modern society.
12.

Id. The EPA itself was also initially staffed with many people who saw
themselves as “shock troops committed to stringent environmental
regulation.” Harris & Milkis, supra note 7, at 231 (quoting former EPA
official Joseph Krevac).

13.

See Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, EPA J., Nov. 1985, at 6, available at
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/birth-epa.html [https://perma.cc/
5E94-F33V].

14.

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970). Although the 1970 enactment amended the pre-existing Clean Air
Act, the 1970 law is generally referred to as the Clean Air Act because it
erected the existing regulatory architecture for air-pollution control.

15.

See Landy, et al., supra note 9, at 36.

16.

Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 46.

17.

See Landy et al., supra note 9, at 245–46 (discussing the Reagan
Administration’s desire to reduce environmental regulation); Turner &
Isenberg, supra note 2, at 51–52 (discussing Regan’s “blithe
nonchalance” about environmental concerns).

18.

See Deborah Solomon & Tenille Tracy, Obama Asks EPA to Pull Ozone
Rule, Wall St. J. (Sept. 3, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100
01424053111904716604576546422160891728 [https://perma.cc/6J6VWHW7]; see also Alex Guillen, Obama’s New Ozone Standard Has Greens
Seeing Red, Politico (Oct. 1, 2015, 4:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2015/10/obama-administration-tightens-regulations-for-smog-causingozone-pollution-214323 [https://perma.cc/228A-QP4Y].
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Consequently, environmental regulations have the potential to reach all
manner of economically productive activity, and such regulatory
impositions are not always received warmly by those subject to
regulation.19 President George H. W. Bush may have campaigned to be
the “environmental president” in 1988,20 but in 1992 he criticized
environmental extremism as part of his reelection effort.21 As a
candidate, Donald Trump went even farther, calling EPA regulation a
“disgrace”22 and threatening to bring environmental protection “back
to the states”23—although as President he has touted the nation’s
environmental leadership and proclaimed his support for “the cleanest
air” and “crystal-clean water.”24
In anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary of the EPA’s founding,
the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law and the Case
Western Reserve Law Review sponsored a symposium to look at the
past, present, and future of the EPA.25 The conference featured an array
of environmental-law and -policy experts, including individuals who
served in environmental-policy positions in each of the last four
presidential administrations, as well as the current EPA Administrator,

19.

In 1979, the Business Roundtable identified environmental regulation as
more expensive than other forms of “social” regulation that were initiated
in the 1960s and 1970s. See Harris & Milkis, supra note 7, at 225 (“Of
all the new social regulation, that dealing with environmental quality
imposed the highest compliance costs on business firms.”).

20.

See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 105 (noting that Bush’s position distanced
him from the Reagan Administration’s environmental record, and drew a
critical contrast with the environmental record of his Democratic
opponent, Michael Dukakis); Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 116
(same).

21.

See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 127; Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2,
at 86.

22.

See Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting from an interview
with Donald Trump in which he said of the EPA: “what they do is a
disgrace”).

23.

Ben Adler, Trump’s Budget Plan Is Completely Insane—and of Course It
Would Screw Over the Environment, Grist (Feb. 27, 2016), https://grist
.org/politics/trumps-budget-plan-is-completely-insane-and-of-course-it-wouldscrew-over-the-environment/ [https://perma.cc/87QS-56B5] (quoting
Trump’s response to a budget question during a CNN/Telemundo debate).

24.

President Donald Trump, Remarks on America’s Environmental
Leadership (July 8, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-americas-environmentalleadership/ [https://perma.cc/F39V-KPR7].

25.

Video of the symposium is available at: Law Review Symposium & Coleman
Burke Center for Environmental Law Conference: The Environmental
Protection Agency Turns 50, Case W. Res. U. Sch. L. (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://case.edu/law/our-school/events-lectures/environmental-protectionagency-turns-50 [https://perma.cc/HLG6-AJZ2].
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Andrew Wheeler. The articles from this conference are published in this
special symposium issue of the law review.
After fifty years, the EPA is still concerned with maintaining and
improving air and water quality, controlling and cleaning up hazardous
wastes, and limiting the environmental toll of modern industry. Yet
much has changed. The focus on larger, more conspicuous sources of
environmental harms has given way to more dispersed, more diffuse,
and often harder-to-identify environmental concerns.26 Nonpoint-source
water pollution and climate change have also brought environmental
concerns, and their causes, closer to home for many Americans. Any
illusion that environmental protection can be pursued merely by
regulating some distant industrial source has been dispelled.27
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is among the “most far-reaching,” and
most successful, regulatory enactments.28 The phase-out of lead from
gasoline, in particular, stands out as a highlight of the Agency’s
potential to advance public health through pollution control.29 The
CAA also provided the EPA with the legal authority to impose limits
on vehicular emissions and to phase-out chloroflourocarbons and other
chemicals that deplete the stratospheric ozone.
The “heart” of the CAA comprises the provisions providing for the
creation and enforcement of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
that each metropolitan area in the nation is required to meet.30
26.

See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 227 (“[T]he brunt of much existing
environmental law has been borne by large industrial facilities; relatively
less attention has been focused on small, more localized sources [of
environmental harms] . . . .”).

27.

See Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 13 (noting the “unanticipated
scope” of federal environmental regulation); see also Lazarus, supra note
8, at 88 (noting the tension between broad support for environmental
regulations and a general unwillingness to bear the necessary regulatory
burdens).

28.

See Janet Currie & Reed Walker, What Do Economists Have to Say about
the Clean Air Act 50 Years after the Establishment of the Environmental
Protection Agency, 33 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 4 (2019).

29.

See Robert V. Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law,
Science and Policy (4th ed. 2003) (noting that lead phase-out is
“widely viewed as one of the greatest environmental success stories, even
by those otherwise critical of environmental regulation”); see also Richard
G. Newell & Kristin Rogers, Resources for the Future, The U.S.
Experience with the Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline (Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper, 2003), http://web.mit.edu/ckolstad/www/Newell.pdf.

30.

See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (characterizing
provisions requiring state implementation plans to meet NAAQS
standards as “[t]he heart of the [CAA]”); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The
Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 121,
121 (2001) (“The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
form the centerpiece of what many consider to be this country’s single
most important environmental program.”).
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Although urban concentrations of some air pollutants had begun to
decline prior to 1970,31 the CAA is widely credited with continuing to
drive down ambient air-pollution levels over the past few decades,32
even as industrial activity and fuel consumption continued to increase.33
Retrospective analyses conclude that some CAA regulations are likely
the EPA’s most cost-beneficial regulatory interventions.34
More recently, and controversially, the CAA has been identified as
a source of authority for the regulation of greenhouse gases.35 This
presents a challenge for the Agency, as the CAA was not written with
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in mind. The Act’s core
provisions focus on locally concentrated pollutants and a cooperative
federalism model through which state and local governments develop
plans to ensure that local areas meet national air-quality goals.
Whatever the merits of this approach, it does not scale cleanly to the
control of a ubiquitous and globally dispersed pollutant such as carbon
dioxide. Yet because Congress has not seen fit to revise the underlying
statutes, these are the tools the EPA has to address the issue.36
A more rational approach to addressing greenhouse gases might
task the EPA with developing a nationwide cap-and-trade system or,
as Donald Elliott suggests, taxes or user fees.37 Normally, one might
assume congressional approval would be required for such a move, but
Elliott suggests that the EPA may already have the necessary statutory
authority to impose fees on carbon emissions. The EPA has arguably
31.

See Robert W. Crandall, Controlling Industrial Pollution:
The Economics and Politics of Clean Air 19 (1983); see also Indur
Goklany, Clearing the Air 137 (1999); Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution
Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 27, 50–
51 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).

32.

See Currie & Walker, supra note 28, at 4 (documenting the decline in air
pollution between 1980 and 2015); see also Andrew Wheeler, The EPA at
Fifty Symposium: Keynote Address, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 883 (2020).

33.

See Currie & Walker, supra note 28, at 3 (“This decline in pollution has
occurred even while primary sources of air pollution such as electricity
generation, transportation, and industrial activity have continued to
expand.”).

34.

See Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the
Clean Air Act from 1990–2020 (2011), available at https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf.

35.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

36.

For a discussion of the EPA’s initiatives and some of the difficulties
applying the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gases, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 421 (2011).

37.

E. Donald Elliott, A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at
Fifty and a Suggestion for how It Might Do Even Better, 70 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 895 (2020).
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been less aggressive than some other federal agencies at seeking to
expand its mandate. Indeed, it had to be dragged by the Supreme Court
into regulating greenhouse gases at all.38 The question for Elliott’s
proposal is whether the EPA is rightly wary of judicial review, or
whether it has been too cautious in its willingness to use broad and
powerful tools to address a looming environmental concern.
At the present moment, there is little prospect of an aggressive or
innovative effort to re-program the CAA for greenhouse-gas-emissions
control. As Administrator Wheeler has made clear, he sees the EPA as
a direct agent of Congress, authorized and instructed to go as far as the
legislature has instructed, and not an inch farther.39 Consequently, the
Agency is pushing states to meet long-standing environmental
obligations, while simultaneously scaling back the more aggressive
regulatory initiatives launched under the Obama Administration. As
Joseph Goffman and Laura Bloomer explain, the EPA is abandoning
the more “progressive” posture and adopting legal interpretations of the
CAA and other statutes that would preclude more aggressive
regulation.40 Insofar as these new interpretations are accepted in the
courts, it could be more difficult for the EPA to reverse course in the
future, barring congressional intervention.41
Judicial review will be decisive in determining whether the Trump
Administration’s efforts to reorient the EPA are successful. This should
not surprise anyone, for the courts have played an intimate role in the
development of federal environmental regulation.42 Even if the EPA’s
regulations are challenged less often than some would suppose, as Cary
Coglianese and Daniel Walters report, the most substantial and
consequential rules inevitably end up in court, where the Agency,
38.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

39.

Wheeler, supra note 32, at 887 (quoting former EPA Administrator
William Ruckelshaus, who said that the EPA’s mission “is to be as forceful
as the laws that Congress has provided.”). In response to questions at the
conference, Administrator Wheeler further said that the EPA is acting on
climate only to the extent authorized and directed to by Congress.

40.

Joseph Goffman & Laura Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How Statutory
Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump Administration’s
Deregulatory Agenda, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 929 (2020).

41.

Of course, at the time of this writing, it is an open question whether the
EPA’s initiatives will survive in court. Trump’s EPA’s early record
surviving judicial review is mixed at best. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hostile
Environment, Nat’l Rev. (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www
.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostile-environment/ [https://
perma.cc/L5RK-HUVY]; Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, A Half
Century of EPA Rulemaking in Court, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1007
(2020) (noting the EPA’s “particularly poor record” over the past several
years).

42.

Coglianese & Walters, supra note 41, at 1017 (“The courts have . . .
proven a fixture in the history of the EPA’s first fifty years.”).
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throughout most of its history, has tended to prevail.43 Industry groups
routinely challenge agency rules tightening controls or imposing new
standards, even when the legal claims against the rules do not seem
particularly strong.44 At the same time, environmentalist groups stand
at the ready to push the EPA to be still more aggressive, or to defend
against efforts to weaken regulatory requirements.
The current moment may be particularly instructive because
judicial review seems to have played a particularly important role when
the EPA’s leadership—or the White House to which it reports—has
pursued particularly dramatic changes in environmental law. It is worth
recalling that Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council45 resulted from the Reagan Administration’s Clean Air Act
regulatory-reform efforts, and that Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA46 was prompted by the Obama Administration’s effort to retrofit
greenhouse-gas-emission controls into the Clean Air Act’s stationarysource provisions.
Environmental-policy narratives often present simple morality tales
in which noble activists seek to enlist the government to combat moneygrubbing industrialists. To be sure, some environmental disputes fit
that script, but plenty of others do not. The particular details of given
regulatory measures often involve environmental trade-offs or pit one
economic interest against another. A fight over gasoline regulation may
pit environmentalists against industry, or it may pit ethanol producers
against oil companies, or perhaps both conflicts occur at the same
time.47 Brian Mannix surveys some of the examples.48
There is ample academic work documenting how economic interests
have molded, and in some cases hijacked, environmental regulation to
serve their own ends, sometimes at the expense of the very
environmental values the laws purport to serve.49 What is the EPA’s
43.

Id.

44.

In some cases, the purpose of challenging rules is not necessarily to have
the rules overturned as much as it is to delay their implementation, which
can itself reduce the economic costs of compliance for regulated firms.

45.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

46.

573 U.S. 302 (2014).

47.

See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Environmental
Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 19 (Michael S. Greve &
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (discussing the special-interest battles
behind the oxygenated-fuel and reformulated-gas provisions of the 1990
Clean Air Act).

48.

Brian F. Mannix, The EPA at Fifty: Time to Give Bootleggers the Boot!,
70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1081 (2020).

49.

For various examples of this phenomenon, see Stuart Buck & Bruce
Yandle, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2002); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in Political
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role in such disputes? One would hope the Agency resists efforts to
commandeer its regulations for economic gain, and sometimes it does.
Yet, as Mannix notes, in some cases the EPA appears to be a willing
participant in the special-interest manipulation of environmental
regulation, even if only to enlist additional political muscle in support
of its other goals.50
Those seeking to influence environmental regulatory decisions
inevitably seek to buttress their policy positions with appeals to agency
expertise. For decades, the EPA and other agencies have conducted
cost–benefit analyses when developing and proposing major reg–
ulations.51 At their best, such analyses help maximize the net benefits
new regulatory initiatives provide, furthering greater transparency and
accountability about the EPA’s major policy choices. At times,
however, interest groups seek to manipulate these analyses to ensure a
desired outcome.
As Wendy Wagner observes, EPA expertise has been under
political and special-interest pressure from the outset.52 Despite such
pressures, the EPA has often been able to maintain its independent
expertise, sometimes with judicial support53—but not always. Under the
Trump Administration, as Michael Livermore explains, the EPA has
departed from many of its traditional methodological practices with
regard to cost–benefit analyses in ways that will make it more difficult
to justify new regulatory measures, particularly those that generate
substantial co-benefits.54
Environmental concerns extend beyond national boundaries, as has
the EPA’s influence. From its inception, the EPA has undertaken to
address international environmental concerns and, as Robert Percival
documents, has influenced the development of environmental law over–

Environmentalism 1 (Terry Anderson ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 845
(1999); Environmental Politics, supra note 47.
50.

Mannix, supra note 48.

51.

There are some notable exceptions, such as where the relevant statutes
preclude the consideration of costs or a cost–benefit analysis. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the
EPA may not consider costs when setting the national ambient-air-quality
standards).

52.

Wendy Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert: Celebrating
the EPA’s Innovations, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1093 (2020).

53.

See, e.g., Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. Wheeler, 956 F.3d 634
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (rejecting the EPA’s attempt to alter eligibility
requirements for science-advisory panels).

54.

Michael A. Livermore, Polluting the EPA’s Long Tradition of Economic
Analysis, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1063 (2020).
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seas.55 Indeed, as Percival explains, the EPA has often “served as a role
model for countries seeking to upgrade their environmental laws and
policies.”56 While numerous environmental problems remain, the United
States remains a leader in air and water quality,57 and the EPA’s
technical and scientific expertise continues to command respect around
the world.58
The EPA’s international significance is only likely to grow in the
years ahead. Global climate change, in particular, will command the
attention of environmental agencies around the globe. Not all of the
action will occur in the public sector, however. As Michael
Vandenbergh, Jonathan Gilligan and Haley Feuerman explore, private
firms and institutions are playing an essential role in the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and the deployment of low-carbon production
methods.59 These trends, they suggest, are facilitated in part by the
“revolving door” between environmental agencies, advocacy organi–
zations, and major corporations.60
Insofar as the revolving door that Vandenbergh and his co-authors
describe is influencing organizational behavior in corporations and other
institutions, it demonstrates how individuals working within existing
institutions can affect environmental change. Yet the history of
environmental law is hardly the sole domain of such institutional
insiders. Those on the outside, protesting the inadequacy of existing
laws, norms, or practices have always played an important role as well.
As Emily Hammond documents, protest plays an important role in the
development of environmental policy in both the legal and political
realms.61 This is not a new phenomenon, however. It has been a part of
the environmental-policy landscape for over fifty years. Indeed, it is
worth wondering whether, without protest, such as the massive
gatherings that occasioned the first Earth Day in April 1970, we would
today be commemorating the EPA’s fiftieth anniversary.
Fifty years after that first Earth Day and the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency, it is worth reflecting on what the
EPA has accomplished, and what has yet to be done. The Agency has
had its share of successes, as well as failures, and it has been at the
center of some of the most contentious and consequential policy debates
55.

Robert V. Percival, The EPA as a Catalyst for the Development of Global
Environmental Law, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1151 (2020).

56.

Id. at 1151.

57.

See Wheeler, supra note 32, at 887.

58.

See Percival, supra note 55, at 1158.

59.

Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., The New Revolving Door, 70 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1121 (2020).

60.

Id.

61.

Emily Hammond, Toward a Role for Protest in Environmental Law, 70
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039 (2020).
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of the past half century. Learning from the EPA’s first fifty years can
help light the path for the next fifty, and help chart the future course
of environmental protection.
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